Tobacco Taxes and Starting and Quitting Smoking: Does the Effect Differ by Education by Madden, David
www.ssoar.info
Tobacco Taxes and Starting and Quitting Smoking:
Does the Effect Differ by Education
Madden, David
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Madden, D. (2007). Tobacco Taxes and Starting and Quitting Smoking: Does the Effect Differ by Education. Applied
Economics, 39(5), 613-627. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500447898
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239770
For Peer Review
Tobacco Taxes and Starting and Quitting Smoking: Does the Effect Differ 
by Education 
Journal: Applied Economics 
Manuscript ID: APE-05-0329.R1 
Journal Selection: Applied Economics 
Date Submitted by the 
Author: 26-Oct-2005 
JEL Code:
C41 - Duration Analysis < , I18 - Government 
Policy|Regulation|Public Health < , D12 - Consumer Economics: 
Empirical Analysis <  
Keywords: Duration, Smoking, Split Population 
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
For Peer Review
Tobacco Taxes and Starting and Quitting Smoking: Does the 
Effect Differ by Education? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  This paper uses duration analysis to investigate the role of tobacco taxes in 
starting and quitting smoking.  Applying a variety of parametric duration models to a 
sample of Irish women, it finds that in general tobacco taxes do influence starting and 
quitting smoking in the expected direction.  It also finds that the effect for starting 
differs by education but in a non-monotonic way, with the greatest effect for women 
with intermediate levels of education.  The results for quitting suggest the greatest 
effect for women with the lowest level of education.  These results are unchanged 
when account is taken of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  I18, D12, C41. 
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Tobacco Taxes and Starting and Quitting Smoking: Does the Effect 
Differ by Education? 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is ample medical evidence indicating the adverse effects of tobacco 
consumption upon health (see Mooney, 2000, for a summary).  Recent Government 
publications in Ireland have suggested the long-term goal of a “tobacco-free society”.  
As the accompanying letter to a Government report stated: “…there is a common 
objective of seeking the most effective measures possible to dramatically reduce the 
level of smoking in our society and above all to prevent our children from starting to 
smoke” (Mooney, 2000).  It follows that identifying the factors behind the decision to 
start smoking and the decision to quit is crucial in terms of formulating policy. 
Given this background, this paper has two principal aims.  First, it examines the 
effect of tobacco taxes on starting and quitting smoking, applying duration analysis to 
a sample of Irish women.  Secondly, it explores the extent to which such a tax effect 
differs by educational background.1 
For duration modelling in the case of starting we use the split-population duration 
model of Schmidt and Witte (1989), Douglas and Harihan (1994) and Foster and 
Jones (2000) while for quitting we follow the approach of Tauras and Chaloupka 
(1999) and Foster and Jones (2000) in applying standard parametric models. 
  The remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we briefly discuss some of 
the existing literature.  In section 3 we discuss our data and describe and present 
results from our empirical model while section 4 provides concluding comments. 
 
                                                 
1 Note that we are not trying to estimate what the optimal tax on tobacco should be.  For a discussion in 
the Irish case, see Madden (2002). 
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2. Review of Literature2 
It was believed at one time that cigarette smoking and other addictive behaviour 
was not rational and so not suitable for conventional economic analysis (e.g. 
Schelling, 1984).  There is now however a substantial body of literature to testify that 
the demand for cigarettes clearly responds to changes in prices and other factors.  
Early studies of cigarette demand employed aggregate time-series data and produced 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand in the region of –0.4.  One disadvantage of 
these studies was that they were unable to distinguish between the elasticity of 
cigarette demand conditional upon smoking and the elasticity of participation.  Later 
studies used the type of individual level data employed in this study.  These studies 
are able to consider separately the effect of price on the probability of smoking and on 
average consumption of smokers.  Furthermore, studies on the probability of smoking 
can be divided into those which view starting and quitting as binary events within a 
discrete choice framework and those which use duration analysis.   
Studies which have examined smoking initiation in a discrete choice framework 
have typically estimated elasticities of participation with respect to tax in the region of 
–0.5 to –1.0 with an apparent inverse relationship between age and smoking elasticity 
(for a summary see Chaloupka and Warner, 1999).  There are fewer applications of 
duration analysis.  Douglas and Harihan (1994) use a split population model to 
analyse starting smoking.  They find no evidence of a statistically significant price 
effect.  Douglas (1998) analysed the hazards of starting and quitting, once again using 
a split population model, but this time with an ordered probit, which distinguishes 
between those who never start smoking, those who start and quit and those who start 
but do not quit.  The “delay” before starting and quitting are modelled using a log-
                                                 
2 The first part of this section draws upon the excellent survey by Chaloupka and Warner (1999). 
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logistic and Weibull specification respectively.  The price of cigarettes is included as 
a time-varying covariate.  The price of cigarettes has no significant effect upon the 
hazard of starting smoking but the number of years an individual smokes has an 
approximately unitary elasticity with respect to price.  Forster and Jones (2000) 
analyse retrospective UK data with a split population model for starting smoking and 
a variety of parametric duration models for quitting.  They find a tax elasticity of the 
age of starting smoking of +0.16 for men and +0.08 for women.  The estimates of the 
tax elasticity of quitting are –0.6 for men and –0.46 for women.  They also include a 
variety of specification tests and find their estimates to be quite robust.  Finally, 
Lopez-Nicolas (2002) analyses Spanish data, once again using a split-population 
model, and finds elasticities of delay with respect to starting of 0.07 and elasticities of 
duration before quitting of –1.3 to –1.5. 
One feature of the above duration studies is that, while they include measures of 
education or income as covariates, they do not interact such variables with the tax, 
thus constraining the tax/price response to b  identical across the distribution of 
education/income.  This is despite evidence from cross-section studies that such a 
response does differ according to socio-economic characteristics such as income and 
education.  For example, Evans et al. (1999) note that in the US higher-income 
individuals are less responsive to tax changes than others.  Townsend et al (1994), 
using UK data, found that men and women in lower socio-economic groups are more 
responsive than are those in higher socio-economic groups to changes in the price of 
cigarettes and less to publicity concerning the adverse health effects of smoking (this 
is also implied in the celebrated model of Becker and Murphy, 1988).  Borren and 
Sutton (1992) find evidence of an “inverse-U” relationship in terms of price 
responsiveness, with a higher elasticity for middle-income men compared to lower 
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and higher-income men.  Their evidence for women, while less clearcut, appears to 
indicate that elasticity declines as income increases.  We explicitly investigate this 
issue in this paper by including interaction terms which permit the effect of taxes to 
differ across the education spectrum.   
We complete this section by briefly reviewing the existing Irish studies on tobacco 
consumption.  A variety of models of tobacco consumption have been estimated 
mostly using aggregate time-series data for Ireland dating from O’Riordan (1969) to 
Madden (1993).  These studies have produced broadly comparable results with a 
median estimate for the price elasticity of tobacco in the region of –0.5, which is in 
line with results from elsewhere in the world.  The use of aggregate time-series data 
precludes distinguishing between the effect of price on the probability of smoking and 
on the demand for cigarettes conditional on smoking.  Conniffe (1995) remedies this 
to some extent by combining analysis of aggregate time-series data with data on the 
proportion of the total population who are smokers.  He found that the proportion of 
the population smoking is unaffected by price (or income) but exhibits a downward 
trend related to health concerns.  Consumption by smokers does not exhibit such a 
downward trend but appears to have a significant price elasticity of around –0.3. 
We now discuss our data and the empirical approach we adopt. 
 
 3.  Data and Empirical Model 
In this section we discuss our data and the empirical model adopted.  Our data 
comes from a survey known as the Saffron Survey which was carried out in 1998 by 
the Centre for Health Economics at University College Dublin.  The Saffron Survey’s 
aim was to survey women’s knowledge, understanding and awareness of their lifetime 
health needs.  Much of the focus of the survey was on the issue of hormone 
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replacement therapy3 but other information regarding health, lifestyle choices and 
demographics was also collected.  For our purposes in this paper the relevant 
questions regarding smoking were as follows: “ Do you currently smoke?”.  People 
who answered “yes” to this question were then asked “For approximately how many 
years have you smoked?”.  People who replied that they did not currently smoke were 
asked had they ever smoked and if they answered yes to this question they too were 
asked for approximately how many years they had smoked, and in what year they had 
stopped smoking.  From the answers to these questions it is possible to calculate the 
years people started (and stopped if applicable) smoking.  The great advantage of this 
type of information is that it is possible to examine the effect of the tax rate in each 
given year on the probability of starting/quitting smoking. 
Before the formal analysis it is useful to look at some summary information on 
our sample.  The original sample size for the Saffron survey was 1260.  However, we 
only have tax and price data going back as far as 1960 and so we drop all women who 
were aged 10 or more in 1960.    This is because we are effectively assuming that 
subjects were at risk of starting smoking from the age of ten, and for women aged ten 
or over in 1960 we do not have the relevant tax and price data for part of the time 
when they were at risk of starting smoking (i.e. the period before 1960).  Our data 
suggests that a starting age of ten or over is a reasonable assumption since the number 
of subjects who reported starting smoking before ten was miniscule.  Thus we only 
have women who were born after 1950, leaving us with a total sample of just over 
700.  Of these, about half have smoked at some stage of their lives and about 35 per 
cent were smoking at time of interview.  In table 1 we give summary statistics (with 
                                                 
3 See Thompson (2000). 
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standard errors in brackets) for a number of key variables for the various subgroups in 
our sample. 
There is relatively little difference across the groups by age except for ex-smokers 
who tend to be older.  As might be expected this group also tends to have worse 
health (which perhaps prompted them to quit smoking).  They also show a higher 
proportion of married, which may reflect people giving up smoking on getting 
married.  Probably the biggest difference across the columns is to be observed in 
educational attainment.4  Of the total population (including smokers) over 60 per cent 
have obtained Leaving Cert or higher, but of those who have ever smoked only about 
47 per cent have.  This drops to about 44 per cent when we examine those people still 
smoking in 1998.  Thus getting beyond Junior Cert appears to not only lower the 
chances of starting smoking, but also increases the chances of quitting if you do start 
to smoke. 
As explained above, the Saffron survey was a cross-section survey carried out in 
1998.  However, we are exploiting the retrospective information which enables us to 
examine the impact of a time-varying covariate such as tax or price on the decision to 
start/quit smoking.  One issue which must first be discussed in the choice of tax/price.  
The choice of such a variable is motivated by the theory of consumer demand which 
suggests that the quantity consumed (or in this case the decision to consume) will be 
influenced by a number of factors, including the consumer price (which in turn is 
influenced by the tax on tobacco). 
The tax element in the retail price of a packet of cigarettes has two components, 
excise duty and value-added tax (VAT).  In Ireland there is a specific and an ad 
valorem excise duty as well as VAT.  Thus the specific excise duty is added to the 
                                                 
4 The default category for education is “Primary Cert” indicating that formal schooling ended at 
approximately the age of 12.  “Junior Cert” indicates formal schooling ceased at approximately 16, 
while “Leaving Cert” indicates schooling ended at approximately 18. 
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producer price and the ad valorem excise duty and VAT is then applied at the 
appropriate rate to obtain the retail price.  While the retail price is thus influenced by 
two tax instruments (the rate of excise duty and VAT) it is arguable that only excise 
duty can be regarded as a specific tax instrument to address smoking, since any 
increase in the rate of VAT will also cause the prices of many other goods to rise.  To 
engineer a rise in the relative price of tobacco, a rise in excise duty is appropriate.  
Unfortunately the data supplied to us by the Revenue Commissioners does not break 
down the tax component into excise and VAT for the period up to 1973.  Thus we 
have taken the total tax component of the retail price and deflated it by the personal 
consumption deflator to arrive at a real tax on tobacco.  This sidesteps the need for 
such a breakdown since any excise tax increase in excess of overall inflation will 
appear as an increase in the real tax whereas increases in VAT will also be reflected in 
increases in the overall price level and thus contribute less to any increase in the real 
tax. 
We thus have a choice between using the real tax content or the consumer price as 
the relevant time-varying covariate.  It can be argued that from the point of view of 
the decision which the consumer makes re starting or quitting it is the consumer price 
which is relevant.  On the other hand, from the point of view of government it is the 
tax content which is the policy variable.  However, from a practical point of view, the 
choice between them is largely irrelevant.  As figure 1 shows, the two series move 
pretty much in tandem and the correlation coefficient between them is 0.97. 
We now turn to discuss the more formal analysis of starting and quitting, dealing 
with starting first.  
 
3.1  Starting Smoking 
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To analyse the decisions to start/quit smoking, we employ duration analysis, with 
the extra proviso that when examining the decision to start smoking we employ a split 
population model.  When modelling the decision to smoke, we include as one of our 
covariates the tax rate for the year in question.  Thus say we observe woman A, aged 
40 in 1998 (the year of the survey) who commenced smoking aged 20 (i.e. in 1978).  
We assume people are at risk of starting smoking from the age of ten (1968 in the 
case of woman A).  Thus we will have ten observations on woman A where she does 
not smoke, followed by the transition in year 11 where she does smoke.  Each 
observation for each year for this woman (up to when she starts smoking) is regarded 
as a separate observation.5  Thus the observation for 1968 for woman A has a duration 
of one, with the tax rate for 1968 as one of the covariates and is regarded as right-
censored.  The observation for 1969 for woman A has a duration of 2, is still right-
censored and has the tax rate for 1969 as a covariate.  This continues up to the 
observation for 1978 where there is a “failure” or transition to smoking. 
Consider now the case of woman B with the same age as woman A but who has 
not started smoking by 1998.  In this case there are thirty observations for woman B, 
all of them right-censored.  No “failure” or transition to smoking is observed.  
Standard duration models assume that failure will eventually take place.  Thus even if 
the last observation for an individual is right-censored (i.e. in our case they have not 
started smoking by 1998) it is assumed that at some stage they will start smoking.  If, 
say, we were trying to model the duration of a light bulb then this assumption is 
realistic.  At some stage the light bulb will fail.  But the assumption is not realistic for 
the case of starting smoking, since a substantial proportion of the population never 
smoke at any stage of their lives.  In this case a split population model is appropriate 
                                                 
5 This expansion of the data has the effect of increasing the sample size.  Hence the sample sizes in 
tables 2-6 differ from that in table 1.  Standard errors are adjusted to take account of such clustering. 
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where the likelihood of each observation is weighted by the probability that the 
individual will ever start to smoke and so the duration analysis is applied only to those 
individuals predicted to start smoking. 
We also estimate log-logistic duration models where the population is not split.  
We estimate then for the population as a whole and also for the population of smokers 
only. 
Before discussing the appropriate parametric duration model we first present in 
figure 2 the plot of the empirical hazard function.  This is particularly useful when 
choosing a parametric hazard function.  We use the lifetable estimate of the hazard 
function (with confidence intervals as shown) and this is qualitatively very similar to 
the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the empirical hazard. 
This figure shows that the hazard increases at first and then decreases.  It reaches 
its peak when the time period equals seven, which corresponds to age seventeen since 
we assume subjects are at risk of smoking from age ten.  There is another local peak 
at age twenty-one and then a fairly sharp decrease.  What this suggests is that a 
monotonic hazard function is not appropriate for this dataset.  A hazard function 
which at first increases and then decreases seems most appropriate, suggesting the 
log-logistic model is worth trying. 
For the smokers in our sample we infer the age of starting as outlined above and 
the duration data can be viewed as a complete spell.  The sample, of course, also 
contains individuals who are not observed to have started smoking.  A parametric 
duration model would interpret these individuals as incomplete spells and assume that 
they will eventually fail and start smoking.  They are viewed as “right-censored” at 
the time of the survey.  As explained above this does not appear reasonable when 
dealing with smoking and consequently Douglas and Harihan (1994) in their analysis 
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of US data and Foster and Jones (2000) in their analysis of UK data have argued that 
a split population model be used.  In this model duration analysis is applied only to 
those individuals who are predicted to eventually start smoking. 
Following Foster and Jones (2000) suppose we define 1=s  for an individual who 
will eventually start smoking and modelling eventual failure (i.e. starting smoking) 
using a probit specification we have 
 )()1Pr( izs α′Φ==  and )(1)0Pr( izs α′Φ−==  
where iz  is a vector of time invariant covariates, Φ  is the cumulative density 
function for the standard normal distribution and α  is a parameter vector.  Thus the 
probability of starting smoking at a given time t is defined conditional upon 
eventually starting. 
 Given the plot of the empirical hazard function above the most appropriate 
parametric duration model is the log-logistic.  The probability density function (.)f  
and the survival function (.)S  of the log-logistic distribution for those individuals who 
eventually start smoking are 
2
1
1
11
])(1[
))(;1|(
γ
γγ
λγ
λ
t
ttxstf i
+
≡=
−
 
γλ
1
)(1
1))(;1|(
t
txstS i
+
≡=  
where ))(exp( tx iβλ ′−= , )(tx i  is a vector of time variant and time-invariant 
covariates and γ  is a scale parameter. 
 Then the contribution to the log-likelihood function for the split population 
model becomes, for individual i: 
))](;1|()()(1ln[)1())](;1|()(ln[ txstSzzctxstfzc iiiiiii =′Φ+′Φ−−+=′Φ ααα  
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For those who are observed as smokers in the sample, 1=ic  and their contribution to 
the likelihood function is simply the log of the probability of being a smoker )( izα′Φ  
times the probability density function of starting at the observed starting age, (.)f .  
For those who are observed as not starting ( 0=ic ), the contribution is the log of the 
probability of never starting )(1 izα′Φ−  plus the probability of starting after the age 
observed at the time of the survey, (.))( Sz iα′Φ . 
 In table 2 we present estimates of the above split population model and in 
tables 3 and 4 we present estimates of the log-logistic model where the population is 
not split.  In tables 3 and 4 we apply the log-logistic model to the whole sample and 
also to the sample of smokers only.  We include both time-varying and non-time-
varying covariates in these models.  Education is frequently regarded as an important 
determinant of health and smoking habits (see Meara, 2000) and we include 
categorical variables for Junior Certificate, Leaving Certificate and third level. The 
default category is Primary Education whereby formal schooling ends at about twelve 
years of age.   
 The mechanism whereby education affects smoking behaviour is unclear.  It 
may indicate that more educated people simply have more information regarding the 
effects of smoking upon health.  It may also indicate that more educated people are 
better able to process or act upon information on regarding the health effects of 
smoking.  Finally it may reflect the presence of a “third” variable whereby which 
simultaneously influences attitudes towards both education and smoking/health.  Thus 
individuals with a low discount rate (i.e. they are more “future-oriented”) will invest 
in both their health capital (by refraining from activities such as smoking) and their 
human capital.  In the absence of reliable measures of such discount rates it is difficult 
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to distinguish between these different mechanisms but it is likely that all three (and 
perhaps others) are at work.6 
 However, in an attempt to distinguish between these influences to some 
degree, we include a variable which we label health knowledge.  As mentioned above, 
the Saffron survey collected a variety of information regarding the health habits and 
needs of women.  Owing to its concentration on hormone replacement therapy, a 
number of questions were asked regarding health knowledge in this area.  As our 
measure of health knowledge we include a dummy variable which measures the 
response to the question “Have you ever heard of osteoporosis?”. 7  Clearly this 
question refers to a dimension of health which differs from smoking, but we do not 
believe it is unreasonable to expect that knowledge regarding osteoporosis may be 
correlated with other aspects of health knowledge, including the health effects of 
smoking. 
 There is one further point which must be borne in mind in terms of 
interpreting the effect of education on the hazard of starting smoking.  Some people 
will have started smoking before completing the higher levels of education, such as 
Leaving Cert or Third Level.  In that respect education is endogenous and could not 
be regarded as a pre-determined variable.  In fact, if we allow for an effect of health 
upon education as well as an effect of education upon health, it is possible that the 
very act of starting to smoke will affect future educational achievement.  Ideally we 
would like to instrument for education to remove this endogeneity.  However, our 
                                                 
6 For a discussion on the relative importance of these mechanisms for the link between smoking, health 
and socio-economic status, see Meara (2001). 
7 While knowledge about osteoporosis may appear to be a narrow definition of health knowledge, it 
may be a suitable measure for our sample.  Typically osteoporosis is more common amongst older 
women.  Given that our sample are all aged 48 or less, this reduces the chances that knowledge 
regarding it comes from direct experience but  instead comes from being generally well-informed on 
health issues.  Also since smoking increases the risk factor for osteoporosis it may be a good proxy for 
health knowledge specifically related to smoking. 
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data does not include any obvious instrumental variable.  Thus for these people 
education may be capturing the effect of other unobserved factors, which influence 
not just the probability of starting to smoke, but also the degree of education obtained 
(e.g. such as the rate of time-preference referred to above).  Such an effect is less 
relevant for the analysis of quitting smoking, since in this case, the vast majority of 
smokers quit after they have achieved their highest level of education.8 
 Ideally we would like to include income as a covariate also.  However, the 
income variable for the data in question is not very satisfactory for a couple of 
reasons.  Firstly, data on this variable is missing for over 20% of the observations 
whereas data for education is available for all observations.  Secondly the income data 
which is available is presented in the form of income ranges.  Thus it is not possible to 
construct a variable for equivalised income (unless we assume income is at the 
midpoint of the range), since we do not know the precise value of income which must 
be equivalised.  On balance, it was felt best not to include income, though this runs 
the risk that the estimated effect of education may be confounded with that of income, 
presuming the two to be highly correlated.  On the other hand, it could be argued that 
the specification we adopt here be regarded as a reduced form, since it is likely that 
income itself will be a function of education. 
 To allow for the possibility of a secular drift in smoking habits over time, 
perhaps related to increased health awareness or general public intolerance towards 
smoking we also include a time trend.  Given that all the variation in tax rates is 
attributable to variation across calendar years there may be an identification problem 
in separating the time trend and tax effects.  Following Foster and Jones (2000) we 
include a higher-order polynomial in time, which allows for a smooth but flexible 
                                                 
8 I am grateful for the comments of an anonymous referee with regard to this point.  
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time trend.  Finally, we also include a cohort dummy, which takes on a value of one if 
the individual is aged 33 or less and a dummy variable for marital status. 
 Before discussing the results it is important to point out that while educational 
achievement and marital status are factors which clearly will vary over a woman’s 
lifetime, we are not treating them as time-varying covariates in this analysis.  We do 
not have information on age of marriage nor on age of completion of education.  Thus 
even though a women may be classified as “married” she will not have been married 
for at least part of the time during which her smoking behaviour is analysed (e.g. 
during her early teens).  However, if education and/or marital status is correlated with 
some more fundamental attribute such as an individual’s underlying rate of time 
preference then the use of “ultimate” educational/marital status is justified, to a degree 
at least. 
 Bearing in mind the evidence cited above that tax responsiveness may differ 
by education or socio-economic characteristics we also include specifications with 
interaction terms which attempt to capture such an effect. 
 
  
3.2  Unobserved Heterogeneity or “Frailty” 
The specifications we have outlined above, plus the included covariates may still 
not explain all the variability in observed time to failure.  The excess unexplained 
variability, or overdispersion, may be caused by misspecification or omitted 
covariates.  In survival analysis this is known as “frailty” since the model is unable to 
explain fully why subjects with shorter time to failure are more frail than others.  A 
frailty model attempts to measure this overdispersion by modelling it as resulting 
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from a latent multiplicative effect on the hazard function.  Thus given a hazard 
function )(th  the hazard becomes )(thα . 
Frailty may also be “shared” in the sense that the subjects in a given group may 
experience the same unobserved heterogeneity e.g. the group may represent a family, 
or, as is the case here, a single subject for which multiple episodes are observed. 
Recall that in the case of frailty the hazard function becomes )(thα .  For purposes 
of identifiability it is usually assumed that α  is distributed with mean one and 
variance θ .  The issue then becomes the estimation of the additional frailty variance, 
θ .  Probably the two most common parametric choices for )(αg , the probability 
density function for α , are the gamma and the inverse gaussian.  While the associated 
hazard function for the two distributions are quite alike there is one important 
distinction.  Suppose we have two individuals with common frailty.  Conditional on 
the given frailty their respective hazards are proportional with, say, cthth =)1()2( /)( .  
Marginally however, for gamma frailties the hazard ratio cthth =)(/)( 1)2( θθ  at 0=t , 
but diminishes with time so that in the limit the ratio becomes unity. 
For the inverse-Gaussian once again suppose that cthth =)(/)( 1)2( θθ  at 0=t .  
However, in this case the limit of this ratio is not unity but 2/1c  so that the frailty 
effect does not diminish completely over time. 
 
3.3 Starting Smoking: Results and Discussion 
 We first of all discuss the results in tables 2, the split-population model and 
table 3, the log-logistic model applied to smokers only (thus there are no right-
censored observations).  The results from the probit for becoming a smoker show the 
expected negative effect for Leaving Cert (and to a lesser extent for third level 
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education) compared to the default category of primary education only.  What is also 
of interest is the positive coefficient on Junior Cert indicating a non-monotonic effect 
of education on the probability of becoming a smoker.  The results also show that 
marriage has a negative effect while younger cohorts are more likely to become 
smokers. 
 Turning now to the duration part of the split population model, when no 
interaction terms between tax and education are used, the coefficient on tax is in the 
expected direction (i.e. positive, indicating that higher taxes delay the period before 
starting), but is not significant.  When the interaction terms are used, the coefficient 
on tax alone is negative but even less well-determined that when no interactions terms 
are used.  The interaction term with Junior Cert is statistically significant however, 
albeit at only the 10% level.  The interaction term with Leaving Cert is similar in 
magnitude and very near conventional significance levels, while the interaction term 
with third level is smaller and insignificant.  Thus tax has no significant effect on 
duration for the default group, followed by a positive effect on duration for those with 
Junior Certificate education.  When we test the null hypothesis of equality of any two 
of the tax interaction coefficients with Junior Cert, Leaving Cert and Third Level with 
each other, we find we cannot reject the null.   
 Thus the tax effect for Junior Cert is higher (and statistically significant) than 
for those with minimal education but not statistically significantly different than the 
tax effect for Leaving Cert and Third Level.  In turn the tax effect for Leaving Cert is 
almost significantly different than for those with minimal education but different than 
the tax effect for Third Level, while the tax effect for Third Level is not significantly 
different than that for minimal education. 
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 These results are partly in line with those of Townsend and Borren and Sutton 
in that the tax effect for those with least education appears smallest.  However, our 
evidence does not clearly support the second part of the “inverse U” type argument, in 
that we don’t find significantly different tax effects between Junior Cert and higher 
education groups.9 
 Turning now to the duration model for smokers only in table 3, we see that in 
general, the coefficients are better determined.  In the model without the interaction 
terms, the coefficient on tax is similar to that in the split population model, and this 
time it is statistically significant.  Perhaps surprisingly, education has little or no 
effect.  This broadly carries through to the model with interaction terms.  Even though 
the coefficient on third level education is positive and significant, the overall effect of 
third level education is given by this coefficient plus the product of the coefficient on 
the interaction term between tax and third level education and the average value of 
tax.  Since it is the log of tax which is used, this second term will be negative, thus 
offsetting to some degree the positive effect of third level education on duration. 
 Similarly, the effect of tax for each educational group is given by the sum of 
the overall coefficient for tax and the interaction coefficient.  In this respect we see 
tentative evidence once again of the first part of an “inverse-U” effect with the 
greatest impact of tax upon those with Junior Cert education.  Evidence of the second 
part of the inverse U is much less clearcut since once again when we test the null 
hypothesis of equality of any two of the tax interaction coefficients with Junior Cert, 
Leaving Cert and Third Level with each other, we find we cannot reject the null. 
 In table 4 we present evidence for the log-logistic model, this time applied to 
the population as a whole i.e. there are some right-censored observations.  We also 
                                                 
9 I am grateful for the comments of an anonymous referee with regard to this point. 
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include the frailty models here, given that the p-values for the LR test for frailty 
indicates its presence.10  For the models without interaction terms, the coefficient on 
tax is in the expected direction and for the model without frailty and the model with 
inverse gauss frailty the coefficients are significant (and similar in magnitude).  The 
results when interaction terms are used are similar across models and once again 
indicate non-monotonicity but interestingly the greatest effect of tax is now seen for 
those with Leaving Cert rather than Junior Cert.  What is also of interest is that here 
we see much clearer evidence of the full “inverse U “effect in that not only is the 
coefficient on the tax/Leaving Cert variable significantly different from zero, it is also 
significantly different from that on tax/Third Level (p=0.0815) and very near to being 
significantly different from the tax/Junior Cert variable (p=0.1227).  Results for the 
models with frailty are qualitatively similar and available on request. 
 Summarising the results from tables 2-4 it seems fair to say that tax does 
appear to have an effect on duration before starting and there is evidence that the 
effect for Junior Cert is greater than the eff ct for minimal levels of education.  
However the evidence that this effect diminishes again as we move to higher levels of 
education is much less clearcut. 
 When using a parametric duration model it is important to determine whether 
the data support the particular parametric form of the hazard function.  Probably the 
most frequently employed method is to use the model based estimate of the 
cumulative hazard function to form what is known as the Cox-Snell (1968) residuals.  
The Cox-Snell residual for subject j at time jt is defined as )(ˆln)(ˆ jjjj tStH −= , the 
estimated cumulative hazard function obtained from the fitted model, given that 
                                                 
10 The presence of frailty was decisively rejected for the models run on smokers only.  Hence we do not 
include them.  They are available on request. 
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)(ˆ jj tS  is the estimated survival function.  Cox and Snell argued that if we have n 
subjects then if the correct model has been fitted to the data, these residuals are n 
observations from an exponential distribution with unit mean.  Thus a plot of the 
model-based cumulative hazard against the cumulative hazard function obtained from  
a nonparametric or empirical estimator should yield a straight line with slope equal to 
one if the parametric model is correct. 
 Figures 3 and 4 show such plots for the log-logistic model for starting 
smoking for smokers only and then for the total population (for brevity we include 
only the specifications with the interaction terms with education.  The plots for the 
other specifications are available on request). 
In evaluating these plots care must be taken regarding the scale of the axes.  For 
the case of smokers only, the residuals deviate from the 45 degree line after the 
estimated cumulative hazard takes a value of around 1.3 indicating a limited degree of 
misspecification.  For the whole population this deviation is observed when the 
cumulative hazard is around 0.9, suggesting a greater degree of misspecification for 
this model. 
 
3.4 Quitting Smoking: Results and Discussion 
For the case of quitting smoking the analysis is in many ways the mirror image of 
the analysis reported above.  In this case the transition, or “failure”, is the act of 
quitting smoking.  Thus a person who has smoked for say 10 years and then quits 
represents ten observations, where the duration variable increases by one each year.  
Each year up to the point of quitting is regarded as right-censored and then the 
quitting year is the transition year.  A person who say starts smoking in 1988 and has 
not quit by 1998 (the year of the survey) is simply treated as having ten right-censored 
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observations.  We do not employ the split-population model for quitting since it seems 
more reasonable to assume that from a population of smokers, all, or at least a 
majority of them, will quit or would eventually quit if they could be observed for long 
enough, than to assume that from a population of non-smokers, all will eventually 
start smoking.  Also as Forster and Jones (2000) point out, it may be extremely 
difficult to identify the separation between those who will eventually quit and those 
who will never quit from data of this sort.11  Figure 5 shows the plot of the empirical 
hazard function for quitting, once again using the lifetable estimate with confidence 
intervals. 
Apart from the spikes at ten and twenty years there is relatively little evidence 
of an increasing or decreasing hazard.12  This suggests that amongst parametric 
duration models, the exponential or Weibull might be an appropriate choice.  The 
survival function for the exponential model (in accelerated failure time format) is: 
)exp()( ttS λ−=  where )exp( βλ jj x−=  and jx  and β  represent a vector of 
covariates and regression coefficients respectively.  The corresponding functions for 
the Weibull model are ))(exp()( pttS λ−=  where )/exp( px jj βλ −=  and jx  and β  
are as before.  Clearly the exponential model is a special case of the Weibull model, 
where 1=p .  We also include estimates from the generalised gamma model.  This is 
an extremely flexible model which nests both the exponential and Weibull model.  Its 
survival function is ))exp((1)( κκ
z
ItS −=  where I is the incomplete gamma 
                                                 
11 We estimated a split population model for quitting and obtained results qualitatively similar to those 
in tables 5 and 6.  Results are available on request. 
12 These spikes suggest that “heaping” may be present i.e. when asked when they quit smoking 
respondents round off their answers to “ten years ago” or “twenty years ago”.  Following one of the 
strategies proposed in Forster and Jones (2000) we include dummy variables for 10, 20 and 30 years in 
the models estimated in tables 5 and 6.  The results are virtually identical to those presented here and 
are available on request. 
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function and  σ
λ−= tz ln .  When 1=κ  this reduces to the Weibull distribution, 
while 1=κ  and 1=σ  gives the exponential distribution. 
Table 5 gives the results for the exponential and gamma models while table 6 
gives results for the Weibull model where we have also included frailty models (with 
the results presented in accelerated time format).13  Note that in terms of intuition, we 
expect coefficients to be of opposite sign to the starting models, since here we are 
estimating the effect of variables on the delay before quitting.  Looking at the models 
first of all without interaction effects, we note that in all cases the coefficient on tax 
has the expected negative sign i.e. higher tax reduces the delay before quitting.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient is also very similar across models but in no case is it 
statistically significant. 
When the interaction terms are included the coefficient on tax increases in 
absolute size and becomes statistically significant for the non-frailty specifications.  
The coefficients on the interaction terms are only significant for Junior Cert for the 
gamma and Weibull models.  For all models it is also the case that when we test the 
null hypothesis of equality of any two of the tax interaction coefficients with Junior 
Cert, Leaving Cert and Third Level with each other we do not reject the null.  Thus 
there is reasonable evidence that the tax effect for Junior Cert is less than that for 
those with minimal education, but no evidence that the tax effect for Junior differs 
significantly from that for Leaving and Third Level.  This is somewhat at odds with 
the evidence for starting.  However, given that relatively few of the coefficients are 
well determined such statements must be made with caution. 
Since the parametric models are nested it is possible to check their validity 
against each other, which is carried out in table 7.  In all cases of the test for σ=1 i.e. 
                                                 
13 The null hypothesis of no frailty was not rejected for the gamma and exponential models 
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between Weibull and exponential, the null is rejected, indicating the Weibull is to be 
preferred over the exponential.  For the test κ=1. i.e. between gamma and Weibull, the 
null is rejected for the case with interaction terms, indicating a choice of gamma over 
Weibull, while it is not rejected when interaction terms are not included.  We also 
present values of the Aikake information criterion, whereby AIC=-2 log likelihood 
+2(c+p+1) where c is the number of model covariates and p the number of model 
specific ancillary parameters.  The model with the lowest AIC is to be preferred.  We 
see that in terms of AIC the exponential model has values well in excess of the 
gamma or Weibull, but there is very little to choose between the Weibull and gamma 
specifications.  The estimated coefficients for these models are also quite similar in 
sign and magnitude.  We also note that all models have a Ramsey RESET p-value in 
excess of  0.8. 
What about the Cox-Snell residuals?  Figures 6 to 8 present Cox-Snell 
residuals and once again for the sake of brevity we present only the residuals where 
the interaction terms are included (the residuals for the models without interaction 
terms are available on request). 
Casual eyeballing of these plots suggests the greatest degree of misspecification 
for the exponential model with relatively little to choose between the gamma and 
Weibull models, though perhaps the gamma model is to be marginally preferred.  This 
is entirely consistent with the results from table 7. 
 
4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has examined the factors influencing starting and quitting smoking for 
a sample of Irish women using duration analysis.  The innovation in the paper is that 
retrospective data in the sample allows for the inclusion of the real tax on tobacco as a 
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time-varying covariate, thus permitting analysis of the effectiveness of a major policy 
variable in terms of combating smoking.  The inclusion of interaction terms with 
education also permits analysis of how the effectiveness of taxation differs according 
to education.  The evidence presented here is mixed.  In terms of starting smoking, 
there is limited evidence of at least the first part of an “inverse-U” effect, with the 
strongest effect of taxation on those with intermediate levels of education and weaker 
effects for those with least education.  Evidence on the second part of the inverse U 
effect i.e. a stronger effect for intermediate education than for higher levels of 
education is less convincing.  It has to be stressed however, that these results are 
relatively tentative given the calculated significance levels.  There is also some 
evidence of  misspecification in the diagnostics. 
The evidence for quitting suggests an even more complex relationship between 
education and the effectiveness of taxation.  Tax seems to be most effective in terms 
of encouraging quitting for those with the least education.  However, there seems to 
be little evidence of any significant difference in the effectiveness of taxation between 
Junior, Leaving and Third Level. 
Overall, the results in this paper are probably more suggestive than definitive in 
terms of the role of tobacco taxes in influencing starting and quitting.  It should also 
be borne in mind that the results here apply only to a sample of women aged 48 or 
under.  However, given the wealth of results from other countries and time periods 
regarding the effect of taxes and prices on tobacco consumption, it is clear that 
tobacco taxation is likely to remain a major instrument in public policy to discourage 
smoking. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Sample 
Variable Total 
(N=703) 
Ever Smoked
(N=348) 
Smokers 
(N=246) 
Ex-Smokers 
(N=102) 
Age 34.38265   
(8.697518) 
 
34.70977   
(8.701864) 
33.02846   
(8.511409) 
38.76471   
(7.806035) 
Age Started Smoking  19.35777   
(5.294379) 
 
19.37295   
(5.169976) 
19.31959   
(5.622771) 
Health Problem .1038407    
(.305271) 
.1264368   
(.3328195) 
 
.1178862   
(.3231307) 
.1470588   
(.3559135) 
Single .3499289   
(.4772868)
.3390805   
(.4740788) 
 
.4065041   
(.4921821) 
.1764706   
(.3831026) 
Married .5860597   
(.4928887)
.591954   
(.4921794) 
 
.5284553   
(.5002074) 
.745098   
(.4379582) 
Widowed .0085349   
(.0920547)
.0057471   
(.0757005) 
 
 .0196078   
(.1393331) 
Separated .0554765    
(.229071) 
.0632184   
(.2437058) 
 
.0650407   
(.2471003) 
.0588235   
(.2364561) 
Primary Education .1052632   
(.3071107)
.1293103   
(.3360263) 
 
.1463415   
(.3541688) 
.0882353   
(.2850375) 
Junior Cert .2745377   
(.4465988)
.3821839   
(.4866208) 
 
.4146341   
(.4936632) 
.3039216   
(.4622205) 
Leaving Cert .4054054   
(.4913199)
.3189655   
(.4667468) 
 
.2723577   
(.4460806) 
.4313725   
(.4977137) 
Third Level .2147937   
(.4109716)
.1695402   
(.3757687) 
 
.1666667   
(.3734378) 
.1764706   
(.3831026) 
Working .5504979   
(.4977976)
.4971264   
(.5007117) 
 
.4756098   
(.5004229) 
.5490196   
(.5000485) 
Cigarettes per Day  15.47977   
(8.827224) 
15.0449   
(8.063403) 
16.53465   
(10.42071) 
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Table 2: Split Population Duration Model for Starting Smoking (N=11733) 
 
 Duration Probit Duration Probit 
Junior Cert 0.019 0.212 0.482 0.206 
 (0.168) 
 
(0.090)** (0.330) (0.092)** 
Leaving Cert -0.097 -0.231 0.372 -0.234 
 (0.178) 
 
(0.089)*** (0.346) (0.090)*** 
Third Level 0.291 -0.158 0.516 -0.177 
 (0.207) 
 
(0.103) (0.383) (0.105)* 
Ln (Tax) 0.451  -0.268  
 (0.391) 
 
 (0.728)  
Cohort 0.258 0.205 0.232 0.206 
 (0.267) 
 
(0.065)*** (0.296) (0.067)*** 
Health Knowledge 0.211 -0.077 0.206 -0.080 
 (0.144) 
 
(0.079) (0.155) (0.080) 
Married 0.054 -0.115 -0.034 -0.122 
 (0.123) 
 
(0.063)* (0.131) (0.065)* 
Tax*Junior Cert   1.214  
   (0.728)* 
 
 
Tax*Leaving Cert   1.123  
   (0.763) 
 
 
Tax*Third Level   0.681  
   (0.793) 
 
 
Time 0.074  0.064  
 (0.077)  (0.083) 
 
 
Time^2/100 -0.310  -0.216  
 (0.470)  (0.499) 
 
 
Time^3/1000 0.012  -0.013  
 (0.085)  (0.090) 
 
 
Constant 1.618 -1.553 1.494 -1.528 
 (0.386)*** (0.100)*** (0.448)*** 
 
(0.102)*** 
Gamma 0.412  0.434  
 (0.032)***  (0.035)*** 
 
 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Log-Logistic Duration Model for Starting Smoking, Smokers Only 
(N=3202) 
 
 
   
Junior Cert -0.094 0.312 
 (0.114) (0.200) 
 
Leaving Cert -0.104 0.273 
 (0.120) (0.213) 
 
Third Level 0.084 0.454 
 (0.122) (0.217)** 
 
Ln (Tax) 0.523 -0.321 
 (0.293)* (0.472) 
 
Cohort -0.143 -0.154 
 (0.138) (0.140) 
 
Health Know. 0.205 0.203 
 (0.092)** (0.096)** 
Married 0.038 0.031 
 (0.071) (0.072) 
Tax*Junior   0.994 
  (0.441)** 
 
Tax*Leaving   0.932 
  (0.491)* 
 
Tax*3rd Level  0.907 
  (0.467)* 
Time 0.074 0.066 
 (0.062) (0.063) 
 
Time^2/100 -0.150 -0.106 
 (0.329) (0.335) 
 
Time^3/1000 -0.023 -0.030 
 (0.053) (0.054) 
 
Constant 1.730 1.441 
 (0.324)*** (0.336)*** 
 
Gamma 0.349 0.348 
 (0.022)*** (0.022)*** 
 
Observations 3202 3202 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Log-Logistic Duration Model for Starting Smoking, Total Population 
(N=11733), S.E. in parentheses, * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;*** 
significant at 1% 
 
   Gamma 
Frailty 
Gamma 
Frailty 
Inv Gauss 
Frailty 
Inv Gauss 
Frailty 
Junior Cert -0.268 -0.042 -0.131 0.094 -0.171 0.048 
 (0.154)* 
 
(0.305) (0.156) (0.268) (0.156) (0.281) 
Leaving Cert 0.318 0.778 0.171 0.765 0.296 0.811 
 (0.158)** 
 
(0.315)** (0.192) (0.280)*** (0.159)* (0.286)*** 
Third Level 0.283 0.451 0.307 0.609 0.329 0.605 
 (0.172) 
 
(0.325) (0.181)* (0.291)** (0.175)* (0.300)** 
Ln (Tax) 0.576 -0.170 0.356 -0.409 0.510 -0.322 
 (0.329)* 
 
(0.667) (0.339) (0.548) (0.284)* (0.572) 
Cohort -0.516 -0.513 -0.025 -0.239 -0.350 -0.350 
 (0.134)*** 
 
(0.137)*** (0.453) (0.215) (0.185)* (0.177)** 
Health Know 0.204 0.198 0.213 0.186 0.199 0.186 
 (0.121)* 
 
(0.122) (0.125)* (0.121) (0.124) (0.125) 
Married 0.278 0.267 0.200 0.245 0.286 0.274 
 (0.102)*** 
 
(0.103)*** (0.162) (0.108)** (0.105)*** (0.105)*** 
Tax*Junior   0.609  0.631  0.600 
  (0.667) 
 
 (0.558)  (0.591) 
Tax*Leaving   1.211  1.366  1.345 
  (0.672)* 
 
 (0.567)**  (0.593)** 
Tax*3rd Level  0.363  0.764  0.672 
  (0.737) 
 
 (0.599)  (0.627) 
Time 0.095 0.087 0.133 0.124 0.131 0.122 
 (0.063) (0.065) 
 
(0.062)** (0.061)** (0.061)** (0.063)* 
Time^2/100 -0.488 -0.457 -0.719 -0.632 -0.652 -0.606 
 (0.326) (0.332) 
 
(0.335)** (0.322)** (0.319)** (0.326)* 
Time^3/1000 0.088 0.084 0.112 0.100 0.106 0.098 
 (0.049)* (0.050)* 
 
(0.054)** (0.050)** (0.049)** (0.050)* 
Constant 2.277 2.060 1.565 1.292 1.515 1.286 
 (0.347)*** (0.393)*** 
 
(0.359)*** (0.359)*** (0.353)*** (0.384)*** 
Gamma 0.620 0.620 0.411 0.417 0.426 0.426 
 (0.037)*** (0.037)*** 
 
(0.036)*** (0.036)*** (0.043)*** (0.042)*** 
Theta   2.204 1.818 2.761 2.780 
   (0.679)*** 
 
(0.413)*** (1.121)** (1.044)** 
LR Test, 
θ=0, p-value 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5: Gamma and Exponential Models for Quitting (AFT format, N=8625), 
S.E. in parentheses, * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 
1% 
 
 Gamma Gamma Exponential Exponential 
Junior Cert -0.133 0.205 -0.113 0.217 
 (0.165) 
 
(0.253) (0.200) (0.311) 
Leaving Cert -0.498 -0.262 -0.548 -0.359 
 (0.163)*** 
 
(0.240) (0.193)*** (0.290) 
Third Level -0.799 -0.486 -0.804 -0.527 
 (0.319)** 
 
(0.276)* (0.254)*** (0.334) 
Ln (Tax) -0.380 -1.170 -0.614 -1.379 
 (0.453) 
 
(0.639)* (0.588) (0.814)* 
Cohort 0.067 0.018 0.594 0.560 
 (0.267) 
 
(0.238) (0.275)** (0.276)** 
Health Know -0.546 -0.541 -0.791 -0.791 
 (0.242)** 
 
(0.216)** (0.298)*** (0.298)*** 
Married -0.099 -0.097 -0.044 -0.041 
 (0.129) (0.128) 
 
(0.163) (0.163) 
Tax*Junior   1.140  1.209 
  (0.644)* 
 
 (0.851) 
Tax*Leaving   0.798  0.694 
  (0.639) 
 
 (0.817) 
Tax*3rd Level  1.136  1.060 
  (0.781) 
 
 (0.980) 
Time 0.006 -0.001 0.019 0.015 
 (0.070) (0.069) 
 
(0.090) (0.091) 
Time^2/100 0.040 0.080 -0.060 -0.038 
 (0.386) (0.377) 
 
(0.486) (0.489) 
Time^3/1000 -0.014 -0.020 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.063) (0.060) 
 
(0.076) (0.076) 
Constant 4.125 3.902 4.560 4.363 
 (0.364)*** (0.369)*** 
 
(0.470)*** (0.498)*** 
Ln(σ) -0.152 -0.141   
 (0.312) (0.136) 
 
  
κ=1 (Wald p) 0.534 0.064   
 (0.608) (0.226)*** 
 
  
Log Likelihood -424.44 -422.769 -435.573 -434.554 
AIC 861.9 861.5 882.1 883.1 
RESET (Wald p) 0.961 0.963 0.958 0.823 
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Table 6: Weibull Models for Quitting (AFT format, N=8625), S.E. in 
parentheses, * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1% 
 
   Gamma 
Frailty 
Gamma 
Frailty 
Inv Gauss 
Frailty 
Inv Gauss 
Frailty 
Junior Cert -0.158 0.126 -0.127 0.091 -0.131 0.090 
 (0.148) (0.224) 
 
(0.160) (0.216) (0.158) (0.217) 
Leaving Cert -0.473 -0.276 -0.483 -0.336 -0.487 -0.329 
 (0.143)*** (0.207) 
 
(0.153)*** (0.216) (0.152)*** (0.214) 
Third Level -0.693 -0.446 -0.826 -0.569 -0.795 -0.536 
 (0.195)*** (0.241)* 
 
(0.228)*** (0.281)** (0.202)*** (0.263)** 
Ln (Tax) -0.372 -1.057 -0.339 -0.901 -0.349 -0.929 
 (0.424) (0.593)* 
 
(0.404) (0.595) (0.403) (0.594) 
Cohort -0.001 -0.043 0.045 -0.003 0.033 -0.017 
 (0.220) (0.217) 
 
(0.220) (0.218) (0.216) (0.214) 
Health Know -0.589 -0.588 -0.555 -0.556 -0.559 -0.564 
 (0.213)*** (0.212)*** 
 
(0.213)*** (0.211)*** (0.211)*** (0.209)*** 
Married -0.099 -0.098 -0.130 -0.127 -0.121 -0.119 
 (0.119) (0.118) 
 
(0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.125) 
Tax*Junior   1.027  0.799  0.826 
  (0.607)* 
 
 (0.599)  (0.605) 
Tax*Leaving   0.705  0.526  0.568 
  (0.584) 
 
 (0.589)  (0.583) 
Tax*3rd Level  0.917  1.048  0.999 
  (0.712) 
 
 (0.692)  (0.692) 
Time 0.013 0.010 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.064) (0.064) 
 
(0.064) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) 
Time^2/100 -0.010 0.009 0.054 0.079 0.064 0.079 
 (0.345) (0.346) 
 
(0.335) (0.333) (0.341) (0.341) 
Time^3/1000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.013 -0.017 -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.054) (0.054) 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Constant 4.183 3.999 4.108 3.960 4.087 3.947 
 (0.338)*** (0.354)*** 
 
(0.334)*** (0.340)*** (0.345)*** (0.347)*** 
Theta   0.802 0.817 1.128 0.981 
   (0.869)** 
 
(0.862) (1.773) (1.489) 
LR Test, 
θ=0, p-value 
  0.086 0.087 0.092 0.102 
Ln(σ) 0.345 0.351 0.466 0.477 0.472 0.467 
 (0.066)*** (0.066)*** (0.139)*** 
 
(0.140)*** (0.158)*** (0.147)*** 
Log Like. -425.248 -423.78 -424.311 -422.860 -424.362 -422.977 
AIC 862.5 862.6 861.6 861.7 861.7 861.9 
RESET 
(Wald p) 
0.997 0.921 0.993 0.743 0.993 0.787 
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Table 7: Specification Tests for Parametric Models for Duration up to Quitting 
 
 Gamma Exponential Weibull 
  Interaction  Interaction  Interaction 
Log L 
 
-424.44 -422.769 -435.573 -434.554 -425.248 -423.78 
Reset (p) 
 
0.961 0.963 0.958 0.823 0.997 0.921 
AIC 
 
861.9 861.5 882.1 883.1 862.5 862.6 
Test G-W 0.534 
(0.608) 
 
0.064 
(0.226)*** 
    
Test W-E     0.345 
(0.066)*** 
0.351 
(0.066)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Tobacco Taxes and Prices 1960-1998
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
19
57
 
19
61
 
19
63
 
19
65
 
19
67
 
19
69
 
19
71
 
19
73
 
19
75
 
19
77
 
19
79
 
19
81
 
19
83
 
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
Real Price of Tobacco Real Tax Content
Page 34 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
H
a
za
rd
Hazard Function, Starting Data (ltable)
seqvar
0 10 20 30 40
0
.05
.1
 
 
Figure 2: Empirical Hazard, Starting Smoking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Cox-Snell Residuals, Log-logistic model, smokers only 
cum. Cox-Snell residual
 H  cum. Cox-Snell residual
.001292 3.41162
.001292
5.8522
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Figure 4: Cox-Snell Residuals, Log-logistic model, smokers and non-smokers 
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Figure 5: Empirical Hazard Function, Quitting Smoking 
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Figure 6: Cox-Snell Residuals for Gamma Model 
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Figure 7: Cox-Snell Residuals for Weibull Model 
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Figure 8: Cox-Snell Residuals for Exponential Model 
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